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If nothing goes wrong, is everything all right?
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In a linked paper, Barnett and colleagues (doi:10.1136/bmj.
i3835) studied the consequences of one of the most disruptive
events a hospital can experience, short of mass casualty incidents
or natural disasters—implementing a new electronic health
record (EHR) system.1 Reports of unintended consequences2
and patient harms3 from these events have raised understandable
concerns about how well we manage them. The investigators
addressed these concerns by estimating changes in a set of
outcome measures at several months before and after
implementation of a new EHR in 17 US hospitals; they then
compared those changes with changes in the same measures in
399 control hospitals over the same regions and dates. They
included only “big bang” implementations, in which all clinical
functions transition to the new system on a single “go live” date;
these are likely more disruptive than gradual roll-outs. The
primary outcomes were changes in 30 day mortality and
readmissions; a secondary outcome was change in the patient
safety indicator composite (PSI-90).4 The authors report no
substantive differences in changes in any outcome between
implementation and control hospitals, leading them to reassure
hospitals contemplating EHR implementation that their study
found, on average, little evidence of short term hazards.
While this is laudable, should it really be reassuring? One of
the most vexing aspects of safety is that only its absence, not
its presence, is detectable.5 A single incident is sufficient to
prove lack of safety, but even long experience cannot logically
establish its presence6: some potentially toxic combinations of
factors might not have been experienced in the study’s short
time frame; and the space of potentially hazardous contributors
is exponentially large and constantly changing as the world
itself changes. For example, Asiana Airlines had operated for
20 years without a passenger fatality, but that experience was
uninformative about the hazards leading to the 2013 crash of
Asiana 214 at San Francisco International.7
Secondly, the primary outcomes (mortality and readmissions)
here are quite distal to EHR implementation and so are
insensitive reflections of risk. Readmissions in particular are
heavily dependent on the quality of outpatient follow-up,8 and
so might be largely unaffected by an EHR change. The
secondary outcome (PSI-90) has been similarly criticised as
insensitive, potentially missing up to 90% of adverse events.9
However, the biggest challenge to the usefulness of these results
lies in the study’s design. The “difference-in-differences” design
used here is generally considered strong but contains a hidden
assumption—that hospitals can be treated like machines:
mechanical, linear systems in which, when one component
changes, all other components continue to operate as before.
This is never the case for complex sociotechnical systems. In
such systems, you can’t change only one thing10—any
intervention sets in motion a tangled web of other changes, some
intended some not, some compensatory, some not; the ramifying
influences of these effects and their feedbacks are not easily
predicted or well captured in a global average.
Neither the human nor the social components of these systems
robotically continue their work as usual after an intervention.
People and organisations dynamically create goals and anticipate
problems; they adjust their activities to achieve those goals and
manage those problems, based on their localised ability to sense
opportunities and barriers, facilitators and constraints, and to
monitor progress. Thus hospitals typically anticipate and attempt
to compensate for disruptions from the deployment of a new
EHR, as they do for hurricanes, winter storms, sporting events,
and other predictable stressors. Similarly, frontline providers
are sensitive and responsive to disruptions in their patients’ care
trajectories and for the most part can compensate for them,
producing the usual unremarkable success of everyday clinical
work.11 Ironically, their typical success in this obscures the
evidence that their extra effort was even necessary.12 Although
that additional effort was unmeasured here, it may be important
in understanding the widespread dissatisfaction with health
information technology among frontline providers.13
For example, mortality and readmissions would likely not
change much if some new intervention forced caregivers to do
all their work standing on one leg. The lack of obvious failure
in such a circumstance would not support a conclusion that the
one leg policy was unproblematic; and it would not be surprising
that frontline workers hated it, despite the lack of “evidence”
of problems. The fact that people can continue to perform
reasonably well using a new technology is not in itself an
wears@ufl.edu
For personal use only: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2016;354:i3941 doi: 10.1136/bmj.i3941 (Published 28 July 2016) Page 1 of 2
Editorials
EDITORIALS
endorsement of that technology. A study showing how, and at
what cost in terms of effort, hospitals accomplished their
successful implementations is a sorely needed next step.
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